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NOTE: GUZMAN V. STATE
Holly E. Engelmann*
A litigant violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution by exercising a
.peremptory challenge based on a juror's gender, ethnicity, or
race.1 Purposeful discrimination, however, is less clear when the propo-
nent of a peremptory strike offers several different factors for the strike,
only one of which is not gender or race-neutral. 2 In the recent case of
Guzman v. State,3 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals followed five fed-
eral circuit courts in adopting and applying the "mixed motives" doc-
trine.4 Under the mixed motives doctrine, "if the opponent of a
peremptory strike makes a prima facie showing of discriminatory pur-
pose, the strike's proponent must demonstrate that he would have exer-
cised the peremptory strike even if the improper factor [race or gender-
based] had not existed or contributed to the decision to strike the pro-
* B.A., 1996, Whittier College; J.D., 2003, Southern Methodist University Dedman
School of Law.
1. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (gender); Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (plurality op.) (ethnicity); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79(1986) (race); see also Wamget v. State, 67 S.W.3d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (per curiam)
(ethnicity); Fritz v. Texas, 946 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (gender); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.261 (Vernon 1989) (race). The U.S. Supreme Court has ex-
tended its previous opinions discussing the violation of equal protection rights when race is
used in the exercise of peremptory challenges in criminal actions to civil litigation. Ed-
monson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991). The nature of the case,
whether civil or criminal, makes no difference in the analysis of the constitutionality of
discriminatory peremptory strikes, since "discrimination on the basis of race in selecting ajury in a civil proceeding harms the excluded juror no less than discrimination in a criminal
trial." Id. at 619.
2. The U.S. Supreme Court "has not yet addressed 'dual motivation' or 'mixed mo-
tives' analysis in the Batson context." Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242, 249 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002).
3. Id.
4. Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 232-33 (3rd Cir. 2002) (holding that mixed motive
analysis was appropriate when one of the reasons that a juror was struck was gender-
based); United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1328 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that dual moti-
vation analysis shifts the burden to the proponent of the strike after the opponent of the
strike has met its ultimate burden regarding racial motivation); Wallace v. Morrison, 87
F.3d 1271, 1272 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (holding that dual motivation analysis applies
when the prosecutor considers both race and race-neutral factors in exercising a peremp-
tory strike); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421-22 (4th Cir. 1995) (remanding case to deter-
mine if litigant would have struck juror even if the discriminatory reason had not been
present); United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1531 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming district
court's finding that the prosecutor would have exercised the strike even without a facially
discriminatory motive); Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 27-31 (2d Cir. 1993) (remand-




spective juror."5 By adopting the mixed motives doctrine, the Court of
Criminal Appeals simply followed the analysis laid out in Batson v. Ken-
tucky,6 and reaffirmed in Purkett v. Elem,7 for evaluating claims that a
litigant has used peremptory challenges in a manner violating the Equal
Protection Clause. 8 The court's application of the Batson analysis to a
situation where a litigant's peremptory strike is not motivated "solely" by
a discriminatory purpose is proper.
Benito Guzman was charged with capital murder for intentionally or
knowingly causing the death of Luis Guzman. 9 The State did not seek
the death penalty; thus, the parties conducted a general voir dire of the
entire jury.' 0 At the end of voir dire, Guzman challenged the State's use
of six peremptory strikes because each of the struck venirepersons was
either Hispanic or African-American." In response to Guzman's Batson
challenge, the State articulated reasons for each of the peremptory
strikes.' 2 With regard to juror number 17, the State articulated four rea-
sons: (1) he was single, (2) he was male, (3) he had no children, and (4) he
fell asleep or shut his eyes for long periods of time.13 The State's use of
gender as a basis for the strike invoked another Batson challenge.14 The
court determined that the State had not exercised its peremptory chal-
lenges in a racially discriminatory way, but failed to independently evalu-
ate the State's gender-neutral explanations for the strike. 15 The trial
court explicitly determined that the State's strike was not racially discrim-
inatory, and Guzman did not challenge that finding.16 Thus, the only is-
sue on appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals was whether the State's
mixed motive for striking juror number 17 was gender-neutral as a matter
of law. 17
After hearing all of the evidence at trial, the jury returned a verdict of
guilty and Guzman was sentenced to life imprisonment by the court.' 8
On appeal, Guzman challenged the adverse ruling on his Batson objec-
tion, as well as the legal sufficiency of the evidence. 19 The court of ap-
peals found that the evidence was legally sufficient but nonetheless
reversed Guzman's conviction.20 The court held that Guzman's Batson
challenge to juror number 17 should have been sustained because the
5. Guzman, 85 S.W.3d at 253-54.
6. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
7. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-78 (1995) (per curiam).
8. Id. at 245-46.
9. Id. at 244; Guzman v. State, 20 S.W.3d 237, 238 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000), rev'd, 85
S.W.3d 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
10. Guzman, 85 S.W.3d at 244.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 254.
14. Id. at 245.
15. Id. at 254-55.
16. Id.
17. Id.




State's dual motive for striking that juror was not, as a matter of law,
gender-neutral. 21 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the
State's petition for discretionary review to re-examine the "dual motiva-
tion" defense to a Batson peremptory strike challenge.22
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded the case
to the court of appeals with instructions that it abate the appeal and order
the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine: (1) whether the State
would have struck juror number 17 regardless of his gender; and (2)
whether Guzman met his ultimate burden of proof in showing that the
State's strike of juror number 17 was based upon intentional
discrimination.23
This case has brought some needed clarity to Texas jurisprudence. In
1991, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether civil liti-
gants could use peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors on
account of race in Powers v. Palacios.24 In a per curiam decision, the
court held that "such an exclusion violates the equal protection rights of
the challenged juror. '25 Through Powers, the supreme court thereby ex-
tended constitutional protection against the impermissible use of peremp-
tory challenges to civil actions as well as criminal cases. Although Powers
extended constitutional protection against discriminatory uses of peremp-
tory challenges, it did not clarify whether the discrimination had to be the
only reason or only a factor. A literal reading of the court's language
would lead one to conclude that constitutional protections are violated
when race is a factor.26
In Benavides v. American Chrome & Chemicals,27 the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals interpreted Powers to mean that a peremptory chal-
lenge is constitutionally impermissible when race is only a factor, rather
than being the sole reason for the exclusion. 28 The Texas Supreme Court
denied the writ of error in the Benavides case, and expressly disapproved
of the court of appeals' language that Texas has created broader protec-
tions that other jurisdictions. 29 Most federal courts have not required
that race or gender be the only, or sole, motivating factor behind a per-
emptory strike and have accepted race and gender-neutral reasons. 30 The
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 255.
24. Powers v. Palacios, 813 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam).
25. Id. at 490.
26. Id. at 491 (emphasis added).
27. Benavides v. Am. Chrome & Chems., 893 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1994, writ denied).
28. Id. at 626.
29. Am. Chrome & Chems. v. Benavides, 907 S.W.2d 516, 517 (Tex. 1995) (per
curiam).
30. See e.g., United States v. Castorena-Jaime, 285 F.3d 916, 928 (10th Cir. 2002) (hold-
ing that "juror inattentiveness during voir dire is a legitimate, race-neutral basis for a per-
emptory strike under Batson"); Murray v. Groose, 106 F.3d 812, 814 (8th Cir. 1997)
(holding that "the appropriate question is not whether race was the sole factor motivating
a prosecutor's peremptory strike but, rather, whether race caused the prosecutor to make a
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Texas Supreme Court did not explain the reasons for its disapproval,
thereby causing confusion as to when peremptory strikes are impermissi-
ble. Either the Texas Supreme Court interpreted and approved of other
jurisdictions' endorsement of a mixed motive analysis, or the court inter-
preted and approved the jurisdictions that endorsed the proposition that
race cannot be a factor at all. Thus, Texas jurisprudence was unclear after
Powers and Benavides. Were peremptory strikes only impermissible if
they were solely based on discriminatory reasons? Or were strikes imper-
missible if any part of the motivation was discriminatory? The present
case answers these questions.
The majority of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reaffirmed its
prior plurality opinion in Hill v. State3' and held that, "when the motives
behind a challenged peremptory strike are 'mixed' and the striking party
shows that he would have struck the juror based solely on the neutral
reasons, then the strike does not violate the juror's Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to equal protection of the law."' 32 Writing for the majority,
Judge Cochran recognized: "Although Batson involved a race-based per-
emptory strike, courts analyze all allegedly discriminatory strikes accord-
ing to the steps laid out in Batson.'' 33 First, the party opposing the
peremptory strike must make a prima facie showing of racial or gender
discrimination. 34 Second, the burden shifts to the proponent of the strike
who must offer a race or gender-neutral explanation. 35 Third, if the pro-
ponent offers a race or gender-neutral explanation, the trial court must
decide whether the opponent has proved purposeful racial or gender dis-
crimination.3 6 In making this determination, the trial court must explic-
itly determine that the opponent of the strike has shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the prosecutor's strike was based on
racial or gender discrimination. 37 The U.S. Supreme Court explained
that in a Batson hearing the proponent's "explanation need not rise to the
level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause" but that the explanation
must be clear, reasonably specific, and based on more than an assumption
that the juror would be partial to the defendant because of his/her poten-
tial bias or shared identity.38
challenged strike"); United States v. Marin, 7 F.3d 679, 686 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that
prosecution's education-based explanation for using a peremptory strike against a Hispanic
venire person was not an "obvious mask for a race-based challenge," but rather a constitu-
tionally acceptable reason for exercising a peremptory strike); Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d
1449 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that statistics showing that race was not the only factor, but
was a significant factor in the prosecution's decision-making process, was enough to
demonstrate a prima facie case of discriminatory intent); see also cases cited supra note 4.
31. Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (plurality op.) (holding that
race may be a factor coexisting with a non-racial reason for a strike, but that race may not
be the reason for the strike), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 905 (1992).
32. Guzman, 85 S.W.3d at 244.
33. Id. at 245-46 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 246.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 255.
38. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
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The dissent in Guzman would have held that the mixed motives doc-
trine does not pass constitutional muster.39 In his dissent, Judge Womack
stated: "To excuse such obvious prejudice because the challenged party
can also articulate nondiscriminatory reasons for the peremptory strike
would erode what little protection Batson provides against discrimination
in jury selection. ' 40 The dissent expressed concern that this holding will
make it easier for lawyers to eliminate jurors for unconstitutional reasons,
thereby eroding the protection Batson provides. 41 The dissent further
disagreed that the proponent should be given an opportunity to offer a
non-discriminatory reason for the peremptory challenge because once a
discriminatory factor has been uncovered that factor taints the entire jury
selection procedure. 42
Judge Johnson filed a separate dissent in which she demands a height-
ened level of scrutiny by the trial court if strikes that are partially moti-
vated by improper discrimination are to be allowed.43 Judge Johnson's
fear is that the majority's holding will encourage lawyers to offer explana-
tions that will facially appear to pass constitutional muster.44 After being
examined by a higher level of scrutiny, however, such an explanation
would be found improper.45
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not decided whether racial or
gender motivation needs to be the sole basis for a peremptory challenge
in order for it to be constitutional, the Court has not ignored the possibil-
ity that a mixed motives explanation could overcome a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination.46 In applying Batson to mixed motives cases, a
few courts47 have read the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion to mean that
the Equal Protection Clause forbids a prosecutor from challenging poten-
tial jurors solely on account of their race or gender on the assumption
that jurors of a particular race or gender will be unable to impartially
consider the State's case against a defendant of the same race or gen-
der.48 The Second Circuit addressed the question of whether the U.S.
Supreme Court intended the adverb "solely" to alter its prior equal pro-
tection jurisprudence so that the mixed motive analysis specifically in-
voked in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.49 would be inapplicable to Batson challenges.5 0 The
Second Circuit resolved the issue by concluding that the U.S. Supreme
39. Guzman, 85 S.W.3d at 256.
40. Id. at 256 (Womack, J., with whom Meyers, Price, and Johnson J.J., join, dissent-
ing) (quoting Payton v. Kearse, 495 S.E.2d 205, 210 (S.C. 1998)).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 258 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82-100.
47. Darden, 70 F.3d at 1531; Howard, 986 F.2d at 28; see also Hernandez v. New York,
500 U.S. 352 (1991) (plurality op.) (O'Connor, J., with whom Scalia, J., joins, concurring).
48. See generally Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
49. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
50. Howard, 986 F.2d at 28.
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Court intended the mixed motives analysis to be applicable to Batson
challenges. 5'
In determining the U.S. Supreme Court's intent, the focus on the ad-
verb, "solely," is completely unnecessary. In the last sentence of the Bat-
son opinion, Justice Powell states: "If the trial court decides [on remand]
that the facts establish, prima facie, purposeful discrimination and the
prosecutor does not come forward with a neutral explanation for his ac-
tion, our precedents require that petitioner's conviction be reversed. '52
The Batson holding clearly directs the trial court to uphold the defen-
dant's conviction if it determines that the prosecutor's racially neutral ex-
planation was legitimate, clear, and reasonably specific. 53 A Batson
challenge, therefore, is only conducted when the prosecutor's supposed
reasons for striking a juror appear to be inherently suspect, either be-
cause of race or gender. Thus, the race or gender factor is implied, and
the prosecutor is asked to proffer an additional reason during the Batson
challenge hearing that is not race or gender related. This is basically a
mixed motive hearing. A race or gender factor is assumed and the hear-
ing is conducted in order for the prosecutor to offer a non-discriminatory
reason for the peremptory strike.
The dissent in Guzman believes that the mixed motives doctrine does
not pass constitutional muster and will serve to make it easier for lawyers
to eliminate jurors for unconstitutional reasons. These fears are under-
standable, especially to the cynical, who fear that lawyers will violate
their oaths in order to strike jurors based on discriminatory reasons in
order to "stack the jury" in their favor.
The Second Circuit addressed this fear by refusing to accept the pre-
mise "that prosecutors will readily disregard the obligations of their office
and violate the requirements of an oath by swearing false denials of racial
motivation. '54 The court rejected this fear by placing confidence in trial
judges to determine the true facts of the prosecutors' motives, just as they
do when determining the subjective mental states of parties and wit-
nesses.55 Further, the ultimate determination as to whether a prosecutor
used a peremptory strike in an unconstitutional manner can be inferred
from all the pertinent circumstances, not just from the prosecutor's ac-
knowledgement. 56 Finally, the court observed: "[N]ot only will a false
denial risk detection and serious consequences, but a frank acknowledg-
ment may bolster the prosecutor's credibility in the assertion of other
race-neutral factors."'5 7
Critics further claim that this ruling diminishes the discriminatory pro-
tections of Batson. No one can seriously dispute the fact that purposeful
51. Id.
52. Batson, 476 U.S. at 100.
53. Id. at 98, 100.
54. Howard, 986 F.2d at 31.
55. Id.; see also Ex parte State, 539 So.2d 1074, 1075 (Ala. 1988).




racial or gender discrimination during jury selection violates a litigant's
right to equal protection and unconstitutionally discriminates against the
excluded juror. Although a party to a cause does not have a right to a
jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his or her own race, 58 the
party does have a "right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected
pursuant to non-discriminatory criteria."'59 Batson clearly stands for the
proposition that the Equal Protection Clause forbids litigants from using
their peremptory strikes against potential jurors on account of their race.
By allowing the proponent of a challenged peremptory strike the oppor-
tunity to establish race or gender-neutral reasons, the holding in Batson
remains unchanged. Batson and its progeny have used a three step pro-
cess for evaluating claims of discriminatory peremptory challenges. The
second step, in which the proponent of the challenged strike is given the
chance to offer a non-discriminatory explanation for the strike, is basi-
cally a chance for the proponent to establish a mixed motive reason.
Since Batson addresses the mixed motives doctrine indirectly, courts that
have used a dual motivation analysis are simply following the U.S. Su-
preme Court's direction.
Some critics see the mixed motives doctrine as another reason to elimi-
nate peremptory challenges altogether. For example, Justice Marshall
stated in his concurring opinion in Batson: "The decision today will not
end racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection
process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory
challenges entirely. ' 60 The elimination of peremptory challenges would
be most harmful to the jury process. There is no constitutional obligation
to allow for peremptory challenges;61 "[p]eremptory challenges are per-
mitted only when the government, by statute or decisional law, deems it
appropriate to allow parties to exclude a given number of persons who
otherwise would satisfy the requirements for service on the petit jury."'62
Although peremptory challenges are not guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion,63 they serve a useful purpose. The primary purpose of a jury is to
"prevent the possibility of oppression by the Government; the jury inter-
poses between the accused and his accuser the judgment of laymen who
are less likely to function or appear as but another arm of the government
that has proceeded against him."' 64 And the purpose of voir dire is to
enable the court to select an impartial jury and assist the parties in exer-
cising peremptory challenges. 65
58. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305(1880)).
59. Id. at 85-86 (citing Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 321 (1906), and Exparte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880)).
60. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring).
61. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 98.
64. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72 (1970) (plurality op.).
65. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991).
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The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals correctly decided Guzman. Five
federal circuit courts have held that if the proponent of a challenged per-
emptory strike is able to offer a reasonable and legitimate non-discrimi-
natory reason for the strike and satisfy the trial judge that the potential
juror would have been struck even without the race or gender discrimina-
tory reason, then the strike is constitutional. 66 Although the mixed mo-
tives doctrine has not yet been specifically addressed by the U. S.
Supreme Court, Batson can be read to allow it, and it is reasonable to
conclude that the U.S. Supreme Court will apply such an analysis with
regard to peremptory strikes.
66. See cases cited supra note 4.
2124 [Vol. 56
